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WATCHING INSIDER TRADING LAW WOBBLE:
OBUS, NEWMAN, SALMAN, TWO MARTOMAS, AND
A BLASZCZAK
Donald C. Langevoort*
The crime of insider trading is a straightforward concept that some courts
have somehow managed to complicate.
—Judge Jed S. Rakoff1

INTRODUCTION
No subject in insider trading law has wobbled more than the standards for
tipper-tippee liability. After setting a fiduciary duty-based framework for
insider trading liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19342 in Chiarella v. United States3 in 1980, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled in Dirks v. SEC4 three years later that tipper-tippee
liability requires proof that the tipper is breaching a fiduciary-like duty in
passing on the information to the tippee for the tipper’s own personal benefit
and that the tippee knows or should know of that breach.5 A host of
bothersome issues arose, mostly left for future litigation over what has turned
out to be decades of refinement. Judge Jed S. Rakoff has decided more than
a few such cases and, far more candidly than most, expressed frustration via
occasional lamentations to his readers (or the law gods) about the wobbles.
His thoughts and frustrations will guide what follows, from a judge whose
involvement in insider trading enforcement goes back to the Chiarella
prosecution.6
* Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This
Article was prepared for the Symposium entitled Securities and Consumer Litigation—
Pathways and Hurdles, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Institute for Law and
Economic Policy on February 28, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to
Hillary Sale, Bob Thompson, Adam Pritchard, Donna Nagy, and Andrew Verstein for
comments on earlier drafts and to Jill Fisch for presenting this paper in my absence at the
Fordham Law Review Symposium.

1. United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq.
3. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
4. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
5. Id. at 667.
6. See Rakoff’s Roots Run Deep in Insider Trading Law, LAW360 (May 29, 2015),
https://www.law360.com/articles/660987/rakoff-s-roots-run-deep-in-insider-trading-law
[https://perma.cc/FGS5-2KVN].
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For two decades after Dirks, the law evolved incrementally in a way that
made the personal benefit requirement easy for enforcers to satisfy.7 Two
kinds of benefits became standard: quid pro quos with some pecuniary
payoffs (e.g., kickbacks to the tipper) and “gifts” of information to family
members and friends. That increasingly relaxed approach emboldened both
criminal prosecutors and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
In a 2012 civil case, SEC v. Obus,8 the Second Circuit offered a sweeping
restatement of all the elements of tipper-tippee liability;9 Judge Rakoff
famously called the decision “Delphic” in his first opportunity to apply its
teachings,10 not in a good way. Among other things, the Obus framework
allowed tippees to be held liable without knowledge of the tipper’s alleged
benefit.11
Soon thereafter, in United States v. Newman,12 a panel of the Second
Circuit addressed personal benefit more strictly, seemingly—but without
explicit language—rejecting Obus in the criminal context.13 The court
sought to connect gift-giving and benefit by demanding proof of a
sufficiently close relationship between the tipper and the tippee “that is
objective, consequential and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary
or similarly valuable nature” and insists that the tippee have actual
knowledge of the breach and benefit.14 Newman was a rare godsend for the
defense side, destabilizing the doctrine on which many prior and ongoing
cases were founded. But then, on review of a Ninth Circuit decision that
rejected the most demanding aspects of the Newman approach as to gifts in
family settings, the Supreme Court agreed that Newman went too far in its
retrenchment.15 Precisely how much too far was unclear, however, so the
wobbling was not over.
Next came United States v. Martoma.16 The main legal question presented
on appeal in this highly publicized prosecution was whether the gift benefit
prong under Dirks and Salman v. United States17 requires a preexisting
family relationship or friendship. Or, is there a personal gift benefit in any
intentional conveyance given with the purpose or expectation that the tippee

7. See Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J.
CORP. L. 1, 5–6 (2016).
8. 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in
the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 449–58.
9. Obus, 693 F.3d at 286.
10. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555
F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
11. Obus, 693 F.3d at 287–88.
12. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
13. See id. at 455 (vacating the criminal convictions “[b]ecause the Government failed to
demonstrate . . . the intent to commit insider trading”).
14. Id. at 452.
15. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016). The court of appeals decision
was written by the peripatetic visiting Judge Rakoff. See United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d
1087 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
16. 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018).
17. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
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will trade? In its first Martoma18 opinion, a divided Second Circuit panel
said the expectation is enough, regardless of to whom, and abrogated
Newman to the extent that it indicated otherwise by its reference to a
meaningfully close relationship.19 There was a petition for rehearing en banc
claiming that, among other things, the panel had no authority to overturn that
holding in Newman absent direct Supreme Court direction. Nearly a year
later, in June 2018, the panel substituted a completely new opinion,20
reinterpreting Newman rather than abrogating it, but still making the tipper’s
specific purpose to confer a benefit on the tippee sufficient and potentially
dispositive.21 Much of Newman’s own precious gift to Wall Street and the
defense side was thus repossessed.22
None of this is news. Nearly everyone who writes much about insider
trading (and a few interlopers as well23) has had something to say about this
remarkable sequence of decisions. As to the panel’s authority to abrogate
Newman, for example, a case comment in the Harvard Law Review treats
Martoma as a “stealth overruling” of Newman24 but then concedes that
Newman was a stealth overruling of Obus (and so on).25
Finally, at the very end of 2019, the Second Circuit sent the insider trading
ball spinning yet again, holding that when a tipper-tippee case is brought as
either mail/wire fraud or under a (until now) rarely utilized public company
securities fraud statute, personal benefit has no place at all in the analysis.
The case, United States v. Blaszczak,26 seemingly provides the means for
criminal prosecutors, but not the SEC (or private plaintiffs), to pursue tippees
18. 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017), amended by United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2d
Cir. 2018).
19. Id. at 70 & n.4.
20. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64. Any reference to Martoma throughout this Article refers to
the amended opinion.
21. Id. at 79 (finding it appropriate to infer “that [the] corporate insider receives a personal
benefit . . . from deliberately disclosing valuable, confidential information without a corporate
purpose and with the expectation that the tippee will trade on it”); see also Marshall v. United
States, 368 F. Supp. 3d 674, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). As addressed in both the withdrawn and
final opinions, this gift argument was not necessarily crucial to the outcome of the case
because there was evidence of pecuniary benefit as well. Dr. Gilman, the main tipper, was
being paid considerable consulting fees for his meetings with Martoma to discuss the clinical
drug trials in which Gilman was involved. The disagreement between the majority and Judge
Rosemary Pooler was about the correctness of the charge to the jury on the theory of gift
benefit (which they both agreed was flawed) and whether it was harmless error in light of the
pecuniary benefit. Compare Martoma, 894 F.3d at 79–80, with id. at 87–88 (Pooler, J.,
dissenting).
22. Courts in the Second Circuit have noted the effect of Martoma on Newman. See, e.g.,
Gupta v. United States, 913 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F.
Supp. 3d 287, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“What remains of Newman therefore applies in only the
rarest of cases.”).
23. Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading After
United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482 (2016).
24. Recent Case, United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018), 132 HARV. L.
REV. 1730, 1734 (2019).
25. Id. at 1734–35.
26. 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, 89 U.S.L.W. 3071 (U.S. Sept. 3,
2020) (No. 20-306).
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simply on their awareness that the inside information constitutes
misappropriated property.27
I. READING DIRKS LITERALLY: BENEFIT TO THE TIPPER
The issue of gratuitous tipping addressed in the two Martoma opinions
might not seem practically important but instead more of a legal brain teaser.
The withdrawn opinion posed a hypothetical about a well-heeled apartment
dweller giving a holiday gift to his doorman in the form of a stock tip in place
of the usual cash.28 But valuable tips to doormen can be seen as an effort to
buy superior service for the forthcoming year, a quid pro quo. So, the
substituted opinion strips this down to a gift of a stock tip to someone simply
with the statement that he (the tippee) can make money by trading on the
information.29 Joan Heminway’s article on the subject uses a more
compelling “Robin Hood” hypothetical about tips meant to take from the rich
and give to the poor.30 All these are simplistically entertaining, but the fact
that some version of the question presented itself in both Newman and
Martoma, each a big-time hedge fund-related prosecution, shows how
closely it lies to the subject of what constitutes a legitimate trading edge for
securities professionals and where the line is that they cannot safely cross.
Big money turns on the answer. Seeing why requires some background.
A. History, Text, and Structure
Historically, insider trading law is very much the product of a particular
and now long gone historical period during which courts construed federal
statutes and rules “not technically and restrictively, but flexibly.”31 The
Second Circuit’s seminal case, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,32 was an
exemplary product of this kind of thinking. Even though open-market insider
trading is hard to see as deceptive (the insider trader communicates nothing
false or misleading simply by submitting an anonymous bona fide order to
buy or sell), the word “fraud” was taken to be sufficiently elastic to

27. See id. at 36–37.
28. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64
(2d Cir. 2018).
29. Martoma, 894 F.3d at 75.
30. Joan McLeod Heminway, Tipper/Tippee Insider Trading as Unlawful Deceptive
Conduct: Insider Gifts of Material Nonpublic Information to Strangers, 56 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 65, 68–69 (2018).
31. See A. C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law in the Sixties: The
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the Triumph of Purpose over Text, 94 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 371, 395 (2018) (quoting SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195
(1963)) (identifying the Supreme Court’s determination of how Congress intended courts to
interpret the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
32. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).

2020]

WATCHING INSIDER TRADING LAW WOBBLE

511

encompass it.33 Duties seemingly reach as far as need be to inspire investor
faith in market integrity.34 Or so it was thought.
That generous approach to securities law was trashed by the Burger Court
starting in the mid-1970s. The surprise, perhaps, is that insider trading
regulation under Rule 10b-5 somehow survived this retrenchment at all. In
Chiarella, the Supreme Court scolded the Second Circuit for its failure to
restrain the overbreadth of “abstain or disclose” but then plastered together
its own doctrinal edifice under the revisionist banner of fiduciary
responsibility.35 That naturally raised concerns about tippers and tippees,
because the latter were outsiders, not fiduciaries. Even though there was no
tipping at issue in Chiarella, Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. dropped a footnote
saying that tippees may inherit the tipper’s fiduciary duty by becoming
“participant[s] after the fact” in the tipper’s fiduciary breach, i.e., coventurers with the insider.36
So, when Dirks came to the Court three years later, Justice Powell once
again got to write the opinion and, not surprisingly, turned his Chiarella
footnote from dicta into holding. Raymond Dirks had received material
nonpublic information about a massive fraud at a well-known issuer from
some whistleblowers and helped them publicly expose the fraud, though not
before causing his clients to dump the stock before its collapse.37 Still feeling
some sting from Chiarella, the SEC (unwisely) took aim against Dirks,
insisting that the fiduciary duty of the source runs to all who came in
possession of the secret with knowledge of its confidential origins. A divided
D.C. Circuit affirmed.38

33. 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND
PREVENTION § 2:2 (2020); Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary
Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1982).
34. See Donald C. Langevoort, From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella: A Tale of Two
Duties, 71 SMU L. REV. 835, 839 (2018).
35. Id. at 842, 845–49.
36. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 n.12 (1980). This footnote itself has an
interesting history. The co-venturer concept, which stresses that tippee culpability is entirely
derivative of the tipper’s fiduciary duty, was used in a Second Circuit decision construing
insider liability under Florida’s state corporation law. See Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d
Cir. 1973). But that decision was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that the
issue of first impression was for the Florida Supreme Court to decide. Lehman Brothers v.
Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390–92 (1974). The Second Circuit decision is interesting because it
draws a clear distinction between the right approach to liability under state corporation law
and under Rule 10b-5, the latter being more expansive. Presumably because the Second
Circuit decision was formally vacated, it was not cited directly in the Chiarella footnote—just
a reference to an American Bar Association committee letter, which cited Schein. Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 230 n.12. What the court in Schein was describing was a form of civil conspiracy
(or more precisely, a conspiracy to breach a fiduciary duty) arising from the formation of a
“common enterprise” to exploit a fiduciary obligation. Schein, 478 F.2d at 822. Making this
connection, the court also drew from the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which provides for
third party liability for intentionally causing or assisting a fiduciary breach. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 (AM. L. INST. 1958).
37. See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 830–33 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
38. See id. at 828.
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Justice Powell was not impressed. His thinking is now well known not
simply because of the Dirks opinion itself39 but because of some remarkable
documents that Adam Pritchard found some time ago in Justice Powell’s
archived materials—opinion drafts, marginal notes, and interchamber
correspondence.40 From these materials, the rationale behind the Dirks
opinion can be pieced together.41 From the earliest memoranda and drafts,
Justice Powell had two clear objectives: to tether the test for tipper-tippee
liability to his Chiarella footnote and to assure that the test would not unduly
chill the bona fide interactions between insiders and market analysts that he
saw as necessary to market efficiency.42 The first drafts of the opinion were
straightforward, simply requiring a court to find that the tipper’s purpose in
passing on the information involved disloyalty to the issuer and its
shareholders, which would not be the case, for example, if the insider was
merely careless in divulging some bit of material information to an analyst,
thinking it immaterial or already public. To this, Justice Powell and his clerk
added contrasting illustrations of liability-creating motivations: quid pro quo
tips for the pecuniary benefit of the tipper and “gift” tips specifically intended
by the tipper to benefit the tippee.43 This duality would stay largely
unchanged throughout the drafting of the opinion.
This subjective approach to personal benefit was apparently pleasing to
Powell—in essence, he was simply saying that the breach of duty on which
tipper liability is premised is the duty of loyalty, as opposed to the duty of
care. There was nothing about making the test particularly demanding
39. See generally Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (reversing the D.C. Circuit’s ruling).
40. See generally Powell Papers, Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission (101982) (1983) [hereinafter Dirks File] (on file with the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives). The
entire Powell Papers collection is available via Washington and Lee School of Law’s Lewis
F. Powell Jr. Archives, at https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/powellpapers [https://
perma.cc/X2KF-2XMG].
41. See A. C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857,
859 n.13 (2015).
42. First Draft: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276 (Apr. 30, 1983), in Dirks File, supra note 40,
at 172. His clerk assigned to the case, Jim Browning (now a federal judge), was much more
aggressive at the outset, trying to get Justice Powell to at least consider either no tippee liability
at all or even no Rule 10b-5 insider trading liability at all, Chiarella notwithstanding. Bobtail
Bench Memorandum from Jim Browning to Justice Powell, Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276 (Mar.
21, 1983), in Dirks File, supra note 40, at 2, 7–11. Browning, in turn, drew heavily in his
memos and drafts from the scholarship of Michael Dooley and Frank Easterbrook. See id. at
8. Browning graduated from the University of Virginia School of Law, where Dooley taught.
43. In the first internal draft of the opinion, reflecting Powell’s handwritten edits, the
tipper prong of what would become the Dirks test required a purpose to benefit or “to make a
gift of the information to the recipient to enable him to gain a market advantage over other
traders.” First Draft: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276 (Apr. 20, 1983), in Dirks File, supra note 40,
at 172, 195. A subsequent memo from Justice Powell to his clerk expressed the same idea.
Memorandum from Justice Powell to Clerks (May 5, 1983), in Dirks File, supra note 40, at
59, 60. The specific reference to friends and family following these sentences appeared in a
subsequent internal draft and then in the draft opinion circulated to the other Justices, as what
clearly seems to be an illustration of the gift benefit, saying that “certainly” there would be a
personal benefit in that situation. Fourth Draft: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276 (May 20, 1983), in
Dirks File, supra note 40, at 231, 253; Chambers Draft (May 22, 1983), in Dirks File, supra
note 40, at 259, 274.
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beyond this, even with respect to analysts. When the first draft opinion was
circulated among the Justices, he quickly got three votes to overturn the SEC.
Somewhat resistant was Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who sent Justice
Powell a memo saying that she objected to his focus on the tipper’s purpose,
which she thought much too subjective.44 She wanted him to substitute a
requirement that the SEC or prosecutors prove up an actual benefit to the
tipper, an objective test.45
From his notes, Justice Powell seems reluctant; as a former corporate
lawyer, it would be natural for him to think of fiduciary duty in terms of an
attitude of loyalty and good faith.46 And fiduciary duty law has never
required an actual benefit to the fiduciary or harm to the beneficiary—quite
the opposite. Justice O’Connor, the former Arizona trial judge, was coming
from another place entirely, concerned about evidence. Compromise
ensued,47 which produced a semantic mess. To preserve the thrust of his
initial approach, Powell kept most of his language about purpose, along with
all his illustrations.48 But he also inserted the requested language about
objective proof of actual benefit without much effort to reconcile the two,
which, if anything, suggests (as Pritchard argues) that both motivation and
benefit in fact may be required, even though neither Justice was advocating
that particular dualism.49
B. Martoma and the Mighty Comma
Back to the question: under Dirks, is the intent to make a gift of the
information disloyal per se, or is that category limited to meaningfully close
relationships with family and friends, for which it may be said—as was later
repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court in Salman—that tipping
someone close to you is like the tipper trading on his own and then giving
the proceeds to a loved one?50 I will come back to this simile in a bit.
Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann’s majority opinion in Martoma is a
hyperclose reading of Dirks’s text in support of a stand-alone “intent to
benefit the tippee” route to tipper-tippee liability.51 In so doing, Martoma
44. See Pritchard, supra note 41, at 865–66.
45. See id.
46. See Stephen Galoob & Ethan Leib, Fiduciary Loyalty, Inside and Out, 92 S. CAL. L.
REV. 69, 86–118 (2018) (emphasizing the cognitive dimension to fiduciary loyalty). At first
glance, Justice Powell may be read to welcome Justice O’Connor’s suggestion (he writes back
about her “quite constructive” memo), but his notes on her memo twice say “no” to what she
is pushing. Pritchard, supra note 41, at 866; Memorandum from Justice O’Connor to Justice
Powell, Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-726 (June 7, 1983), in Dirks File, supra note 40, at 70, 71–72.
47. The draft with Justice O’Connor’s revisions can be found in the Dirks File. Second
Draft (June 9, 1983), in Dirks File, supra note 40, at 371, 371–88. Two heavily marked up
pages show how hard Powell was trying to keep as much of his approach as possible. Id. at
385–86.
48. Id.
49. Pritchard, supra note 41, at 870.
50. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016).
51. See United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2018). The discussion
here is entirely about the substituted (i.e., the authoritative) opinion, though the withdrawn
one had a similar emphasis.
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seizes on language in Dirks that had been in plain sight but largely ignored
in tipping jurisprudence up until then.52 The analytical progression in the
key paragraph in Dirks says, as discussed above, that while purpose may be
the ultimate question, objective proof as to the benefit is required.53 It then
refers to pecuniary and reputational benefit as two ways to do this (oddly
using “i.e.” rather than “e.g.”).54 After a citation on that point to some
secondary authority, it gives examples for when the inference of such benefit
is proper: “there may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the
particular recipient.”55 Martoma seizes on the comma in the middle of this
sentence to claim that the Supreme Court is offering two distinct routes to
proving a tip, the latter being a demonstrable intention to benefit the tippee
without the need for any quid pro quo.56 Only in the next sentence—with the
word “also” to suggest that this is additional, not defining or limiting—is
there any specific reference to friends or family or (in the sentence that
follows that one) the foggy point about such tips being the equivalent of
trading followed by a gift of the proceeds.57
From this textual exegesis, Katzmann concludes that intent to benefit the
tippee—regardless of any preexisting relationship—suffices for personal
benefit; the subsequent reference to friends and family simply illustrates that
those sorts of gifts can have an element of quid pro quo, too. The panel
majority in Martoma is thus clinging tightly to Justice Powell’s original focus
on the tipper’s purpose. As noted earlier, the particular words and phrases
after the comma that are crucial to Judge Katzmann are ones that appeared in
Justice Powell’s drafts early on, well before Justice O’Connor’s input. As
seen in the archives, the distinct idea that an intentional tip to give someone
a marketplace advantage is a clear breach of loyalty is stated in the first
internal draft and Justice Powell’s accompanying notes, initially without any
reference to family or friends.58 With all the subsequent changes that went
on elsewhere in the drafting, this distinctive language about the purposeful
tip in contrast to the quid pro quo remained unchanged. In dissent, however,
52. Not surprisingly, Martoma claims this language was put to use in SEC v. Warde and
even Newman. See id. at 74 (citing SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1998)); id. at 76–
77 (citing United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014)). But, in neither case
does the court put much, if any, weight on this language as a distinct route to liability. See
generally United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014); SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 1998).
53. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663–64 (1983).
54. Id. at 663.
55. Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
56. See Martoma, 894 F.3d at 74. This reading makes the reference to relationships at the
beginning of the sentence applicable only to what comes before the comma. See Dirks, 463
U.S. at 664.
57. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (“The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of
nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a
trading relative or friend.”).
58. See Memorandum from Justice Powell to Clerks (May 5, 1983), in Dirks File, supra
note 40, at 59, 60; First Draft: Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-176 (Apr. 30, 1983), in Dirks File, supra
note 40, at 172, 195; see also supra note 43.
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Judge Rosemary Pooler does just the opposite, seizing on the handful of
Justice O’Connor-inspired snippets that reject purpose in favor of actual
benefit, objectively demonstrated.59 Judge Pooler is insistent that gift benefit
arguments be accompanied by a convincing (if perhaps circumstantial) story
about the potential for some kind of gain, such as the inference that giving a
tip to a close family member or friend will naturally enrich all those in the
relationship. She wants nothing to do with purpose as such.
The Dirks Court’s failure to reconcile the two inconsistent ideas explains
much about Martoma’s difficulty. It comes down to whether one can fairly
read the insistence on benefit in fact as evidentiary in assessing the presence
of disloyalty or something more dispositive. In other words, how much did
Justice Powell give away to Justice O’Connor? Different sentences or
fragments suggest different answers to this question, which is not surprising
given that Justice Powell was trying to satisfy Justice O’Connor without
silencing his own strong views about the motivational nature of fiduciary
duty and good faith.60
Textualism aside, does it make sense to proscribe deliberate gift tips
outside the circle of family and friends as breaches of loyalty? Commenting
on Obus and Newman, Pritchard says no.61 In contrast, Donna Nagy and
Joan Heminway both say yes, in part by reference to recent Delaware
fiduciary duty case law,62 which puts in the category of disloyalty and bad
faith actions deliberately taken without regard for the interests of the
corporation. I agree with them; even without such resort, I think that there is
a benefit whenever fiduciaries take something valuable as their own to do
with as they please without serving their principal (the issuer or source),
regardless of what they ultimately choose to do. The secretive exercise of
dominion is itself a form of (unjust) enrichment.63 Judge Rakoff seems to
agree, stating in United States v. Pinto-Thomaz64 that the “use of the term
59. See Martoma, 894 F.3d at 81–83 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
60. I see little in the Supreme Court’s Salman opinion to resolve any of this confusion.
Salman quotes Dirks extensively, including sentences inspired by both Justices Powell and
O’Connor as if there is no tension. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016).
Curiously, the Court puts the distinct intent to benefit the tippee language in italics, without
explanation. See id. at 427 (identifying the Court’s statement in Dirks that it was not the
tipper’s “purpose to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks” (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at
667)). Judge Pooler in the withdrawn Martoma opinion notes that the government in Salman
made broad arguments about the meaning of tip and the role of personal benefit, which the
Court sets forth. See United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2017), amended
by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018). The opinion then immediately says that the case can be
resolved on narrow grounds—the nature of gifts in a family setting. See id. at 87. She suggests
that this is an implicit repudiation of the government’s argument. See id. I do not see it as
such but, rather, the common approach of not seeking to resolve doctrinal issues beyond what
is necessary to answer the question posed by the grant of certiorari. The Salman Court gave
no reasons why it would reject the government’s position.
61. See Pritchard, supra note 41, at 869–74.
62. See Heminway, supra note 30, at 90–91; Nagy, supra note 7, at 42.
63. Jill Fisch seems to be making a similar point about the tipper’s increase in utility. See
Jill E. Fisch, Family Ties: Salman and the Scope of Insider Trading, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
46, 51 (2016).
64. 352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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‘personal purpose’ or ‘personal advantage’ [in Dirks] . . . could perhaps have
averted subsequent confusion.”65 In other words, the stand-alone inference
coheres well enough with the Dirks Court’s intent.
Reputational benefit—the most undertheorized form of personal benefit—
is also probative here. Justice Powell adds it to the Dirks opinion relatively
late, as part of Justice O’Connor’s edits, perhaps to make clear (in opposition
to what Justice O’Connor was pushing) that personal benefit does not have
to involve an immediate or certain payoff to the tipper; it is enough to
reasonably hope that something good may come as payback later on. We are
doubling back to purpose, in other words. No prior relationship is necessary
here: consider a hypothetical where a young investment banker brazenly
seeks out a big-name hedge fund manager whom he has never met and simply
delivers a valuable tip with the words “you’re welcome.” Given how the
favor bank works on Wall Street, this might be characterized as seeking a
reputational benefit and, given the cronyism involved, certainly should be.66
On the other hand, hoping for something of significant value in return may
seem delusional, failing Judge Pooler’s reasonable expectations approach.
So, while a sensibly broad approach to reputational benefit would obviate the
need to address my hypothetical as a form of gift-giving, I think the standalone intent-to-benefit standard is better aligned with what animates the
inclusion of reputation in the personal benefit analysis. Gratuitous tips may
be good conversation starters, with the relationship coming later.
There is one more textual clue in Dirks that bolsters the Martoma
conclusion, though Judge Katzmann’s opinion does not stress it. Toward the
very end of the Supreme Court’s opinion, in concluding that there was no
breach for personal benefit by the whistleblowing insiders—which resolves
the case—it says “nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable
information to Dirks.”67 If a meaningfully close personal relationship was
essential to gift-giving, the Court presumably would have noted that, because
there was no such relationship. This language, which seems to admit the
possibility of a gift benefit in a tip to an investment professional with whom
the tipper had no prior relationship, much less a close personal one, also fits
better with Martoma’s reading.
This, however, brings us to the two “friends and family” sentences in
Dirks, which explain that tipping friends and family members “resembles”
the insider trading and then giving the proceeds to them.68 The analogy is
65. Id. at 299.
66. See Donald C. Langevoort, Informational Cronyism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 37, 39
(2016). For a corruption-based theory of insider trading, see Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading
as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928 (2014).
67. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983).
68. Id. at 664. In the evolution of the Dirks opinion, the idea and language about friends
and family, including the simile, is taken almost verbatim from an opinion piece by Leonard
Chazen that appeared roughly at the time the case was being argued. See First Draft: Dirks v.
SEC, No. 82-176 (Apr. 30, 1983), in Dirks File, supra note 40, at 172, 196–97 (citing Leonard
Chazen, Dirks Presents Unique Corporate, Social Issues, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 14, 1983, at 14,
18). For a while, the draft opinion gave Chazen credit for the concept with an extensive
quotation, see id., but Justice Powell later directed his clerk to remove the citation on grounds
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only superficially helpful, because the same thing could be said about many
tips; indeed, in early drafts this form of “indirect benefit” was invoked to
justify the entire idea behind the personal benefit test, not just the gift prong.
If the idea is that the gains to the tippee will somehow come back to enrich
the tipper because of the close relationship, that seems both speculative and
poorly defined. Think of the many cases that could not easily be categorized:
for example, a tip to the portfolio manager of the endowment fund of one’s
alma mater. There are just too many forms the relationship between tipper
and tippee can take for the analogy to bear much weight in disposing of cases.
That said, the two sentences have come to be part of the canon of tippertippee law and not so easily bypassed. The Salman court used them to
conclude that the gift-giving language in Dirks needs no further elaboration,
making the sentences the rationale for rejecting Newman’s tightening.69 And
as Jack Coffee points out, taking the facts in Martoma (ignoring the
pecuniary quid pro quo), it is very hard to see what Dr. Gilman did as
“resembling” trading massively for his own account and gifting the proceeds
to a hedge fund by way of Mathew Martoma.70 The friends and family
qualifier to gift benefit has been around, used, and quoted long enough for it
to have taken on a life of its own, predating Newman and its gloss. So, while
I have been persuaded that Martoma’s reading probably makes better sense
of the law of fiduciary responsibility on which insider trading theory is
grounded, the more conventional reading of gift benefit—bolstered by
Salman’s fascination with the simile—may be the more likely reading, at
least outside the Second Circuit or until the next stealth overruling.
II. TWO THEORIES, CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES
Essentially, insider trading is a variation of the species of fraud known as
embezzlement, which is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[t]he
fraudulent taking of personal property with which one has been entrusted,
especially as a fiduciary.” . . . If the embezzler, instead of trading on the
information himself, passes on the information to someone who knows it is
misappropriated information but still intends to use it in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities, that “tippee” is likewise liable, just as any
knowing receiver of stolen goods would be.

that reliance on such media commentary might not be appropriate. Second Draft: Dirks v.
SEC, No. 82-276 (May 10, 1983), in Dirks File, supra note 40, at 204, 225. Much the same
idea was also expressed in the American Bar Association letter cited in the Chiarella footnote
with reference to friends, family, “or others.” See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
230 n.12 (1980) (citing American Bar Association Section of Corporation, Banking, and
Business Law, Comment Letter on Material, Non-public Information (Oct. 15, 1973)). This
cite was eliminated in editing as well. Second Draft (May 10, 1983), in Dirks File, supra note
40, at 204, 216.
69. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016).
70. John C. Coffee Jr., Tippees and Tippers: The Impact of Martoma II, THE CLS BLUE
SKY BLOG (July 23, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/07/23/tippees-andtippers---the-impact-of-martoma-ii [https://perma.cc/8HN7-JZUE].
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—Judge Jed S. Rakoff71

Judge Rakoff has for some time now expressed the wish that insider
trading law be more thoroughly grounded in misappropriation, from which a
simpler “stolen goods” approach to tipper-tippee liability would naturally
follow. He has expressed no affection for the classical theory from which
the Dirks test was derived. Yet today, Dirks controls under both theories.
Again, it is helpful to go back in time.
A. More Doctrinal History
The federal securities law of insider trading through (and including) the
retrenchment in Chiarella and Dirks was entirely about the duties to abstain
or disclose that traders with an informational advantage owe to others trading
contemporaneously in the securities markets. The Supreme Court held that
such a duty exists when the defendant is a fiduciary who trades or tips,
because others trading contemporaneously in the marketplace can be seen as
the beneficiaries of that trust. This is the classical theory, for which Dirks
sets the rule for tipper-tippee liability.
When Chiarella was being briefed and argued before the Supreme Court,
the U.S. Solicitor General’s Office abandoned the more expansive
conceptions of duty that flourished in the aftermath of the Second Circuit’s
Texas Gulf Sulphur decision and tried to get the Court to buy into a narrower
framework, which it presumably thought had a better chance before an
increasingly conservative lineup of Justices.72 The solicitor general’s
approach made the law turn on misappropriation, which was presented in two
distinct versions in the government’s brief.73 One version retained the focus
on protecting contemporaneous marketplace traders by imposing a duty to
abstain or disclose to the market anytime the information has been
misappropriated, whether by breach of fiduciary duty or mere theft. The
other found deception in the breach of entrustment itself, where the trader is
pretending to be a faithful fiduciary to the source of the information but in
fact acting disloyally. In Chiarella, the majority accepted neither argument
on the merits, finding them insufficiently charged below, therefore leaving
both for future consideration if and when properly pled and charged. For the
71. United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287, 295–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (first
alteration in original) (quoting Embezzlement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014));
see also SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (containing Judge Rakoff’s
statement that insider trading “is a form of cheating, of using purloined or embezzled
information to gain an unfair trading advantage”), aff’d, 726 F. App’x 832 (2d Cir. 2018).
72. See Langevoort, supra note 34, at 846. Until shortly before briefing and argument,
Frank Easterbrook was the deputy solicitor general to whom those who eventually handled
the case for the Solicitor General’s Office reported. Before leaving and thereafter, Easterbrook
took the lead in urging a property-based approach to insider trading. See Interview by Kenneth
Durr with Frank Easterbrook, Chief Judge, U.S. Ct. Appeals for the Seventh Cir., in Chicago,
Ill.
(Jan.
13,
2011),
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f4405e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/oral-histories/
20110113_Easterbrook_Frank_T.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5K7-Q5Y9].
73. See generally Brief for the United States, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980) (No. 78-1202), 1979 WL 213521.
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time being, at least, fiduciary duty was it.74 In dissent, Chief Justice Warren
E. Burger said he would apply the market-facing disclosure approach to
misappropriation to sustain Chiarella’s conviction.75 In a concurring
opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens agreed with the majority but said
encouraging things about the fraud-on-the-source argument for future
cases.76
The Supreme Court eventually embraced the misappropriation theory a
decade and a half later in United States v. O’Hagan.77 But which version?
The Second Circuit’s early cases supporting misappropriation were
somewhat ambiguous on this, not seeming to put much weight on—or even
noticing—much in the way of substantive distinction.78 Since then, however,
it has become clear that it was not Chief Justice Burger’s conception79 but
rather the argument that Justice Stevens liked. By feigning fidelity, the
misappropriator deceives the source of the information, taking advantage of
misplaced trust. To experts in white collar crime, this version of
misappropriation bears a close family resemblance to the “honest services”
idea that for so long drove many high-profile mail and wire fraud
prosecutions, which would explain its quick take-up among prosecutors and
judges at the time.80 The biggest practical difference between the two
theories has to do with the “mere theft” of information. The Burger approach
readily includes all purloined information within the duty to disclose, while
the fraud-on-the-source theory only kicks in when the theft takes a deceptive
form, like embezzlement.81 As the quotes from Judge Rakoff show, it is
tempting today to treat misappropriation as the theory of insider trading,
expressing the first principles from which insider trading doctrine should
follow. After all, almost all classical cases are also misappropriation cases
(though not vice versa). Indeed, Judge Rakoff seems anxious to throw the
classical theory into the trash.82

74. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236–37.
75. Id. at 241–43.
76. Id. at 237–38.
77. 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997).
78. In the first Second Circuit decisions applying the misappropriation theory, the
“Burger” and “Stevens” approaches to the theory were intermingled. For example, consider
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032–33 (2d Cir. 1986), which Judge Rakoff
argued on the defense side. It appears that Justice Powell considered the misappropriation
theory an invalid application of § 10(b) but left the Court shortly before he would have been
able to reject it in Carpenter. A. C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and
Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 33–34 (1998).
79. Contrary to Judge Rakoff’s attribution, see United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F.
Supp. 3d 287, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
80. About the same time as Chiarella was decided, Judge Rakoff, though not yet a judge,
wrote an extensive survey of the history and use of the mail and wire fraud statutes. Jed S.
Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771 (1980).
81. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2009) (involving insider trading
via hacking).
82. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 297 n.3 (“While the ‘classical theory’ may still be
occasionally employed even today, it is hard to imagine an insider trading case that does not
fit comfortably within the confines of the misappropriation theory.”).
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It is tempting to speak of misappropriation solely in property-like terms,83
but this is intellectual quicksand. The resemblance to embezzlement has
been noted in the case law for decades (pointedly made in the government’s
brief in Chiarella84), but, of course, embezzlement takes money or property
away from its rightful owner; insider trading is merely the unauthorized use
of the information, often without any measurable harm to its owner.85 The
misappropriation theory is more about the abuse of trust in the sharing of
secrets, applicable to settings where the “owner” of the information has
invested in the gathering of valuable information that has been entrusted to
agents of the firm but extending well beyond. It is more contract than
property and, even then, can be as much in the hands of the courts as a matter
of law (fiduciary duty) than the expressed intent of the parties. Yet, the
embezzlement and stolen goods rhetoric persists.86 It appeals especially to
conservative-leaning academics and judges because it appears to privatize
the interests at stake, reducing the purview of judicial discretion to the
identification of preexisting protectable economic interests rather than
searching promiscuously for more public-regarding duties.
The case law on tipper-tippee liability under the misappropriation theory
took a sharp turn in this direction in the 1990s. Both the SEC and criminal
prosecutors took the litigation position that personal benefit was required
only in classical cases, which found some (though not clear) support.87 This
distinction came to matter more and more as misappropriation grew in reach.
The pivotal case was United States v. Libera,88 involving “tippers” who
worked at the plant where Business Week magazine was printed and
distributed and who—for very little, if any, compensation—delivered
advance copies to recipients who used the advantage to buy and sell stocks
83. Judge Ralph Winter played a considerable judicial role in translating an academic
theory to doctrine. See his concurring and dissenting opinion on the application of the
misappropriation theory in United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
banc). He sought to draw a line between business-related misappropriation and more informal
settings in a case involving a family-controlled business.
84. See Brief for the United States, supra note 73, at *16.
85. Rational insider traders take pains to conceal their trading from all but a close circle,
if that, because leakage erodes the trading advantage.
86. There is also a conceptual difference. The Burger-endorsed misappropriation theory
was grounded in investor protection and avoiding marketplace abuse by embezzlers and
thieves. By contrast, the theory underlying fraud on the source in its pure form is the
protection of the owner’s property interest in exclusive use of the secrets from embezzlement
and deceptive thievery. The first makes insider trading a matter of public law; the second
smacks of private law. I suspect that many judges who apply the misappropriation theory as
we know it today instinctively think of it as grounded in investor protection, in the spirit of
Chief Justice Burger. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg tries hard in O’Hagan to make this
connection, though formally adhering to the victimization of the source alone. See Donna M.
Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan
Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1273–74 (1998). Judge Rakoff can be read as doing so as
well.
87. See, e.g., SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); SEC v. Musella, 748 F.
Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). A few years later, the First Circuit read Second Circuit law as
not requiring a personal benefit. See generally SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000).
88. 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993).
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mentioned favorably in the investment column. The Second Circuit affirmed
Rule 10b-5 liability in a striking opinion written by Judge Ralph Winter,
rejecting the defendants’ main argument that the workers did not actually
know what the recipients intended to do with the information (i.e., it was not
obviously a tip to facilitate trading because the recipients could have had
many reasons for wanting an advance look). Judge Winter anticipated Judge
Rakoff with repeated references to embezzlement and stolen information and
firmly embraced a property rights approach.89 Misuse of someone else’s
information was enough, apparently, and as far as what was in it for the
workers, the panel said simply that “it may be presumed that the tippee’s
interest in the information is, in contemporary jargon, not for nothing.”90
Dirks is cited, but reference to personal benefit was conspicuously absent.91
A few years later, in United States v. Falcone,92 the Second Circuit
reaffirmed Libera in concluding that nothing in the Supreme Court’s
intervening O’Hagan decision in any way undercut its reasoning.93 The
exclusion of personal benefit from the analysis was even more palpable in
Falcone.94 Misappropriation law was heading in its own direction, in other
words, hastening Dirks’s further demise. Trial judges in the Southern
District of New York were confused.95
That turn in the maze led to a dead end. Obus, Newman, and Martoma
now all say without qualification that the Dirks test for tipper-tippee liability
applies equally to classical and misappropriation insider trading cases, as if
the stolen goods line of cases never happened. Amazingly, Obus (which
Newman and Martoma simply follow on this point) cites Falcone alone for
this proposition,96 even though Falcone reads as just the opposite. In this
89. Id. at 600. The court did insist on a fiduciary breach by the insider and that the tippee
must know or have reason to know of the breach. In that sense, Dirks has an influence, but
personal benefit is not part of it.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001). Falcone (written by now Justice Sotomayor) makes
clear that there are separate and distinct tests for tipper-tippee liability for classical and
misappropriation cases, with personal benefit relegated to the former. Id. at 231–32.
93. Id. at 232–33.
94. In contrast to Libera, Falcone, and other cases distancing misappropriation cases from
Dirks, an Eleventh Circuit case squarely adopting a unified standard noted that Dirks could be
rendered moot simply by avoiding the lesser-included classical theory in a charge, and it
seemed too consequential a holding to allow that to happen. SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1279
(11th Cir. 2003).
95. For an expression of angst about the direction the Second Circuit law was taking at
that time, see, for example, SEC v. Smath, 277 F. Supp.2d 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
96. SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285–86 (2d Cir. 2012). Neither Falcone nor Libera states
explicitly that they are rejecting personal benefit. But both (especially Falcone) subdivide the
discussion of tippee liability with personal benefit playing a significant role in the classical
context, while there is no mention of it in the separate articulation of tipper-tippee liability for
misappropriation. An SEC administrative law judge took the implausible view that the latter
omission is only because it was not something that needed to be mentioned by the court of
appeals. See Bolan Jr., Initial Decision Release No. 877, 2015 WL 5316569 (Sept. 14, 2015).
On review, an equally divided commission affirmed the administrative law judge’s dismissal
of the SEC’s case. See Joseph C. Ruggieri, Securities Act Release No. 10389, Exchange Act
Release No. 81143, 2017 WL 2984863 (July 13, 2017).
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sense, Obus put a sudden stop to one wobble in the tipper-tippee case law but
set another in motion as district court judges faced up to the challenges of
applying the personal benefit test in the wave of hedge fund trader
prosecutions that were cresting at the time, including the prosecutions
leading to Newman and Martoma.
B. Dirks as a Workhorse
Anyone who thinks that the stock market is a level playing field obviously
has no contact with reality.
—Judge Jed S. Rakoff97

Judge Rakoff is right, of course. But insider trading law has never really
promised a level playing field. There was a brief period of time after Texas
Gulf Sulphur when it might have been so read, but that passed surprisingly
quickly. By the mid-1970s, even the SEC had rejected strict egalitarianism
as bad law and bad policy. The courts in the Second Circuit distanced
themselves from its unrealistic implications as well. As I have written
elsewhere recently in tracing this history, by the time of Chiarella, the
equality principle had mainly become a bogeyman for Wall Street to use in
pushing back against insider trading law’s reach.98
Since that time, insider trading law has been read mainly for the work it
does. Most courts and commentators seem to treat the Supreme Court’s
decision as straightforward and (assuming they take it seriously) functional
in design—about sorting the circumstances in which outsiders gain an
informational advantage into the good and the bad. As courts up through
Obus made light of personal benefit, critics saw this as a perversion of the
Court’s original intent that could undermine the work it is supposed to be
doing, although for most of that time neither the SEC nor prosecutors were
targeting market professionals in a way that pushed hard on these efficiency
concerns. With the hedge fund cases, that changed: Newman and its
enthusiasts were resurrecting Dirks not only in form but in function. Two
recent empirical studies of stock trading by market professionals found that
the Newman decision was followed immediately by a noticeable step-up in
aggressive trading.99
The common story is that Dirks is all about market efficiency and (to some
at least) protecting property rights in private information. As to the former,
97. Thomas A. Zaccaro, Nick Morgan & Lily Lysle, The Insider Trading Mess Congress
Is Trying to Fix, LEXOLOGY (May 16, 2019) (quoting an April 16, 2019, bench ruling by Judge
Rakoff on a pretrial motion in Pinto-Thomaz), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=266c1283-c920-4b56-a508-667e53e518c9 [https://perma.cc/J9W5-ALKL].
98. See Langevoort, supra note 34, at 840–43, 846.
99. See Manesh S. Patel, Does Insider Trading Law Change Behavior?: An Empirical
Analysis, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 447, 479–84 (2019); Marcin Kacperczyk & Emiliano
Pagnotta, Becker Meets Kyle: Inside Insider Trading (Nov. 30, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3142006 [https://perma.cc/
GPC7-ZR8A]. The latter authors also show that in the few years before Newman, with the
arrival of Preet Bharara as U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, there were
more cautious trading patterns. Id. at 5.
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legitimate information searching should not be chilled by the threat of
liability; the elements of tipper-tippee liability should thus work to protect
analysts and professional traders. As discussed, this idea gets prominence in
both Chiarella and (especially) Dirks, so there is no doubt it was important
to Justice Powell and his colleagues in the majority of those two cases.
Deciding doctrinal issues by reference to first principles is hard without a
clear theory of what those principles should be, however. A fairness-based,
level playing field principle is sometimes put forth in favor of aggressive
regulation (which almost automatically signals disdain for Dirks and
Newman) but is notoriously difficult to substantiate via hard evidence. More
sophisticated versions focus on market liquidity and the cost of capital.100
The “alt” theory in insider trading, as noted, is that it is solely to protect the
property rights belonging to the owner of the information from
embezzlement or its equivalents. Judge Winter’s opinions in United States
v. Chestman101 and Libera took this on as their mission, as previously
discussed. A fundamental implication of the property rights idea is that the
owner gets to do with the information as they wish, free of government
meddling at least so far as the securities laws are concerned. While an early
version of this idea implied that there was no need for federal regulation at
all—owners can protect themselves using common-law agency, fiduciary,
tort, contract, and property principles—that seems to have faded in favor of
seeing insider trading law as a useful federal law tool for sanctioning
informational embezzlers.
But recall that Judge Winter still wanted no place for personal benefit. By
contrast, in his commentary on Newman and the withdrawn Martoma
opinion, Professor Jon Macey argues that a personal benefit requirement is
crucial to cement a strict property rights/private ordering approach.102 He
thus treats the Dirks test (including personal benefit strictly applied) as a
necessary protection for dissemination of information that serves the owner’s
private self-interest.103 If we are reasoning from first principles, however, it
is unclear why personal benefit is a better test than what Macey really seems
to want to get at—business purpose, which the majority emphasized in
Martoma. The standard reading of Dirks from the beginning is that a tip
genuinely motivated by a belief that the tip is in the issuer’s best interest does
not violate Rule 10b-5. A handful of courts in the Second Circuit have
suggested that looking for business purpose is indeed a sound way to apply
100. See Merritt B. Fox et al., Informed Trading and its Regulation, 43 J. CORP. L. 817,
833–35 (2018); see also Merritt B. Fox & George Tepe, Personal Benefit Has No Place in
Misappropriation Tipping Cases, 71 SMU L. REV. 767, 776–77 (2018) (arguing that the law
is not so clear that further change could not take place to restore the view that the Dirks test
be confined to classical cases). In many ways Fox and Tepe anticipate the Blaszczak case. See
United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, 89 U.S.L.W.
3071 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2020) (No. 20-306).
101. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
102. See generally Jonathan Macey, Martoma and Newman: Valid Corporate Purpose
and the Personal Benefit Test, 71 SMU L. REV. 869 (2018).
103. See id. at 876; see also Jonathan Macey, The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test, 69
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 64, 66–67 (2016).
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Dirks: if no plausible business purpose can be gleaned from the facts, the
presumption is of personal benefit.104 Indeed, this follows from the reading
of Dirks given earlier, requiring objective evidence from which to infer
subjective (selfish) purpose.
However this particular issue is resolved, I worry that it concedes too much
authority to the “owner” of the information. This is inevitable under the
fraud-on-the-source approach to misappropriation, where it is clear that the
owner can license others to trade on the information for any reasons it wishes,
regardless of any adverse effects on the marketplace. The law is far less clear
under the classical theory, which makes me less inclined to put it in deep
storage the way Judge Rakoff seems willing to do.
Suppose an independent, disinterested board of directors authorizes the
CEO and CFO (and others, perhaps) to trade with abandon on any inside
information they possess. (A more realistic example might be to allow senior
executives to trade without restriction for forty-eight hours after the latest 10K or 10-Q.) Would that provide a complete defense to an insider trading
charge brought by the SEC, assuming that the defendant possessed material,
nonpublic information at the time of the trade? Property rights advocates
would argue, with some force, that the issuer owns the information so that,
assuming proper corporate governance principles are satisfied, those in
authority can waive the fiduciary obligations that would otherwise attach,
just as under the misappropriation theory. But if we see the classical theory
as a federally created duty owed to marketplace traders, it is far from clear
that such absolution would work simply by operation of the state law
principles of corporate governance.105 Precedent favors treating trading by
the issuer itself (stock buybacks in particular) as unlawful under Rule 10b-5
if the issuer is in possession of undisclosed material facts.106 But if the issuer
cannot trade based on inside information, why is Dirks commonly read to say
that selective disclosure (tipping to an analyst or active shareholder) is

104. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 33, § 4:7 (citing SEC v. Rubin, No. 91 CIV. 6531, 1993
WL 405428 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1993)); see also SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 632 (7th Cir. 1995).
The government made this argument to the Supreme Court in Salman, but the Court affirmed
on narrower grounds.
105. Both Chiarella and Dirks triggered some debate about “issuer-authorized” insider
trading. For an extensive discussion with citations as to the pros and cons of insider trading
as a default rule, see Zachary J. Gubler, A Unified Theory of Insider Trading Law, 105 GEO.
L.J. 1225, 1263–67 (2017). For an argument in favor, see John P. Anderson, What’s the Harm
in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 795 (2015).
106. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 33, § 3:6 (discussing cases); see also Mark J.
Loewenstein & William K. S. Wang, The Corporation as Insider Trader, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L.
45 (2005). The SEC agrees. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and
Others; Adoption of Safe Harbor, 47 Fed. Reg. 53,333, 53,334 n.5 (Nov. 26, 1982) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others,
68 Fed. Reg. 64,952, 64,953 n.5 (Nov. 17, 2003) (to be codified at pts. 228–29, 240, 249, 270,
and 274). On the policy importance of this, see Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading via the
Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (2014). The adoption of Regulation FD, see infra note
125, is an even more dramatic rejection of issuer control over “its” information.
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permissible so long as intended to carry out company policy, which is
Newman’s high ground?107
III. NEVER MIND: THE BLASZCZAK DETOUR
And so we come to the Second Circuit’s most recent wobble on personal
benefit, Blaszczak, holding that the Dirks personal benefit test only applies
to claims of securities fraud within the confines of Rule 10b-5 (or more
precisely, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), not to mail or wire fraud
prosecutions or the “new” Sarbanes-Oxley criminal securities fraud
statute.108 Judge Richard J. Sullivan’s opinion is an embrace of
embezzlement as the touchstone for these Title 18 statutes, which does
connect it to all the foregoing in this Article. He is channeling (with
attribution via multiple citations) what both Judges Winter109 and Rakoff110
have said: when insider trading is thought of as misappropriation akin to
embezzlement, a stolen goods approach to the liability of those who receive
tips makes sense without any personal benefit gloss. As noted, until Obus,
that was arguably the Rule 10b-5 law in the Second Circuit, and so—albeit
only in the criminal context—Blaszczak may just be correcting the wobble
from Obus’s earlier apparent mischaracterization of Libera and Falcone.
This makes it at least a partial stealth overruling, without even touching Rule
10b-5.111
The law of mail and wire fraud is massive, even as to the specific issue of
misappropriation of intangible property, and certainly as to the “honest
services” jurisprudence that went into its own wobble and has not ever, so
far as I can tell, found stability.112 In its decision in Carpenter v. United
States,113 the Supreme Court explicitly accepted the possibility that mail and

107. Other academics and I have posed some version of this question for some time. See,
e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1023 (1990); see also LANGEVOORT, supra note 33, § 4:7. More recently, with reference
to Newman and Martoma, see Fox & Tepe, supra note 100, at 773–74; Michael Guttentag,
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 69 FLA. L. REV. 519, 542–43 (2017).
108. United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 34–37 (2d Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed,
89 U.S.L.W. 3071 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2020) (No. 20-306); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1348.
109. In his concurring opinion in Chestman, Judge Winter explicitly addressed the
relationship between Rule 10b-5 and mail fraud doctrine as to personal benefit, acknowledging
that it was a hard question he was not ready to answer. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d
551, 581 (2d Cir. 1991).
110. See United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); United
States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 370–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 F. App’x 98 (2d
Cir. 2014).
111. Judge Sullivan was the trial judge in the Newman case, taking Obus at its word about
having no need for awareness of personal benefit, and was then famously reversed. See United
States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2014) (describing proceedings below).
112. Illustrated most notably by the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Skilling,
561 U.S. 358 (2010). See also Brette M. Tannenbaum, Note, Reframing the Right: Using
Theories of Intangible Property to Target Honest Services Fraud After Skilling, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 359 (2012).
113. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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wire fraud can reach insider trading even when Rule 10b-5 might not;114
starting immediately in the aftermath of its decision (which made many
securities law types uncomfortable115), commentators and judges asked
whether Dirks’s personal benefit test should have any continuing place with
respect to crimes akin to embezzlement.116 Whatever the preferred answer,
the issue was always in plain sight but of little import so long as personal
benefit was easily found, which only changed after Newman. Judge Rakoff
has long been a mail/wire fraud exceptionalist (once calling mail fraud the
prosecutors’ “Stradivarius”117), wanting to treat securities fraud as a mere
“specialized subspecies” of the more fundamental mail and wire fraud
prohibition.118 In Blaszczak, the Stradivarius came out of its case.119
Being no fan of the personal benefit test, I am not bothered by the new
music. If Martoma is right that it can easily be satisfied by any deliberate
tip, the test is doing little more than distinguishing between breaches of
loyalty and care. Blasczcak insists on a taking for personal use (i.e., a
misappropriation), so the practical impact of the ruling is small.
However, the shift in emphasis from civil to criminal that Blaszczak invites
raises two conjoined concerns that can produce collateral damage in SEC
cases. Criminalization invites judges to get on their high horses about
114. See id. at 28; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 678 n.25 (1997)
(indicating that it was not the Court’s job to decide whether this kind of result was good
enforcement policy). In Blaszczak, the Court puzzlingly also sought to bolster the case for
allowing mail fraud to have a broader reach than Rule 10b-5 by reference to Justice Thomas’s
dissenting opinion in O’Hagan, United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 36 (2d Cir. 2019)
(citing O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 682 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting)), and United States v. Bryan,
id. (citing United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 953 (4th Cir. 1995)), both of which were efforts
to strike down the misappropriation theory under Rule 10b-5—which the majority of the Court
rejected.
115. See generally John C. Coffee Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential
Information After McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization,
26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1988).
116. See, e.g., Michael R. Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible Rights: The
Redefinition of the Mail Fraud Statute, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181, 214 (1988). More recently,
Bill Wang gave this issue substantial coverage in Application of the Federal Mail and Wire
Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. MIA.
L. REV. 220 (2015).
117. Rakoff, supra note 80, at 771.
118. United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 F.
App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
119. The court’s point about personal benefit makes more sense in terms of mail and wire
fraud. Section 1348 is meant for the world of public company securities fraud, though
characterized by immense confusion about why it was needed and what it does differently
from § 32(a) of the 1934 Act, whether as to insider trading or more generally. See Wendy
Gerwick Couture, Criminal Securities Fraud and the Lower Materiality Standard, 41 SEC.
REGUL. L.J. 77 (2013); Karen E. Woody, The New Insider Trading, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 594
(2020); see also LANGEVOORT, supra note 33, § 8:13. A principal proponent in Congress was
Senator Patrick Leahy, who indicated the need to create a mechanism for prosecution not
bound by technical limitations. That is odd, because that is precisely why § 10(b) was created.
See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990). Perhaps Leahy would point to the decision by Enron prosecutors
to charge a margin violation to avoid a more complicated route to convictions. See William
H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 BUS. LAW. 961 (2003).
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embezzlement and common thievery; at the same time, there is the impulse
to rein in the laws’ application in the name of notice and lenity.120 The
former can inadvertently pulverize the more nuanced equitable principles
that underlay insider trading policy; the latter can spillover to the civil context
where they lose most of their punch.
We see this in the part of Newman that survives today: the insistence that
the tippee have knowledge of both the tipper’s breach and the personal
benefit. The phrase Dirks used—“should know”—has seemingly been lost
in translation.121 Consider the facts of Newman if brought in a civil
enforcement context. The defendants were third- and fourth-level tippees of
earnings-related information from Dell and NVIDIA, which came from midlevel insiders at the issuers.122 The “gift” part of the case arose because it
was not obvious why they leaked the information; there were casual
relationships between the insiders and the analyst/acquaintances who were
the first-level tippees, not known down the chain of other tippees.123
However, the leaks were high quality and repeated, suggesting deliberateness
from within the companies.124 The court stressed that these leaks might well
have been designed to serve the issuer’s interests, but if these particular
tippers were acting with authorization, it would seem to be a gross violation
of the SEC’s Regulation FD.125 My sense is that, had Newman been a civil
enforcement proceeding, liability under Rule 10b-5 could be sustained.
120. Judge Rakoff notes this in SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015),
but finds sufficient evidence of knowledge or avoidance. The finding of liability in Payton
was subsequently affirmed, 726 F. App’x 832 (2d Cir. 2018). At roughly the same time as
Judge Rakoff, another judge in the Southern District of New York moved in the same direction
by suggesting that the standard for tippee liability in civil cases should still be drawn from
Obus. See SEC v. Jafar, No. 13-cv-4645, 2015 WL 3604228 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2015).
121. I read Newman as limited to criminal prosecutions, where the requirement of
willfulness might explain why it ignored the Dirks phrase. Arguably, that would leave Obus
standing in SEC actions. But the case nowhere says that or invokes the criminal willfulness
requirement as explaining the derivation of a knowledge test. In Dirks, Justice Powell did not
see his test (which for him was all about the tipper’s disloyal purpose) as addressing the
scienter requirement. See Pritchard, supra note 41, at 867–68. Justice Powell’s clerk at the
time vaguely recalls that this was just an effort to conform to language in pre-Chiarella
precedent. Id. at 864–65, 865 n.43. This makes some sense in that the more expansive
formulation could be found in two authorities cited at around this point in the opinion,
Professor Louis Loss and former SEC Commissioner Richard Smith, whose concurring
opinion in an SEC administrative proceeding in many ways gave Justice Powell a roadmap
for (and was repeatedly cited in) Chiarella and Dirks. See Invs. Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 9267, 1971 WL 120502 (July 29, 1971).
122. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014).
123. See id. at 443, 453–454.
124. See id. at 454.
125. Regulation FD is an SEC disclosure rule requiring that if material nonpublic
information is to be given to analysts or active shareholders, it must simultaneously be
disclosed to the public. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 33, § 12:12. By all accounts, it was
adopted by the SEC because of concern that, under Dirks, selective disclosure is hard to
sanction. The category of persons whose disclosure triggers the Regulation FD obligation
include lower or mid-level personnel authorized by higher-ups to convey such information;
unauthorized personnel are presumed to be acting for personal benefit. I agree with Donna
Nagy that Regulation FD ought to play a role in fashioning insider trading rules, even though
it explicitly is not an insider trading rule itself. See Nagy, supra note 7, at 39–41. An
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Also, by defending the counterintuitive result that the SEC’s burden in
civil enforcement can be more stringent than in criminal prosecutions,
Blasczcak may inadvertently become self-fulfilling, blowing the personal
benefit requirement back out of proportion. Defendants will insist that the
distinction between the presence of personal benefit (civil) and its absence
(criminal) be respected. That may be the next wobble to watch.
CONCLUSION
Lamentations aside, the best animating rhetoric for insider trading
regulation today can be found in Judge Rakoff’s own words: the promise to
fight against a playing field that is tilted in favor of cheaters, i.e., those who
would wrongfully exploit their access to secrets.126 His insider trading
jurisprudence (holdings, dicta, and asides) harkens back to Chief Justice
Burger in Chiarella, who had the good idea of building a more expansive
source of wrongful access or use while avoiding the unrealism of equal
access.127 Going back a number of years now, Judge Rakoff has been calling
for Congress to replant the garden maze of doctrine that has too many circles
and dead ends by writing a clear statutory definition of insider trading.128
Putting aside his claim (with which I disagree) that insider trading is a
straightforward concept, he is right about the unnecessary complications
some courts have caused. Surely there is a better way going forward.

intentional violation of a law (Regulation FD) is, under contemporary corporate law, a breach
of loyalty.
126. SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The Unites States
securities markets—the comparative honesty of which is one of our nation’s great business
assets—cannot tolerate such cheating if those markets are to retain the confidence of investors
and the public alike.”), aff’d, 726 F. App’x 832 (2d Cir. 2018).
127. See Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s
History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 883–84 (1995). Donna Nagy has
long championed Chief Justice Burger’s view of misappropriation as well. I read Chief Justice
Burger as grounding the case against Chiarella in terms of embezzlement or theft but not
confining the Rule 10b-5 duty to violations of positive criminal law. His approach presumably
takes in all wrongful ways of obtaining or using inside information.
128. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 367 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d,
555 F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 559. Many others agree.
See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, The Fiduciary Principle of Insider Trading Needs Revision, 56
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 121 (2018). Judge Rakoff is currently taking part in the revisionist
effort. See THE BHARARA TASK FORCE ON INSIDER TRADING, REPORT OF THE BHARARA TASK
FORCE
ON
INSIDER
TRADING
(2020),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5e1f2462d354fa5f5bac2699/t/5e2a1e9d12e0c33aefc41303/1579818654541/Report+of+the+
Bharara+Task+Force+on+Insider+Trading.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5US-9KW2].

